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Abstract
This paper describes our work exploring the suitability of formal specification methods for independent verification
and validation (IV&V) of software specifications for large, safety critical systems. An IV&V contractor often has to
perform rapid analysis on incomplete specifications, with no control over how those specifications are represented.
Lightweight formal methods show significant promise in this context, as they offer a way of uncovering major errors,
without the burden of full proofs of correctness. We describe a case study of the use of partial formal models for V&V
of the requirements for Fault Detection Isolation and Recovery on the space station. We conclude that the insights
gained from formalizing a specification are valuable, and it is the process of formalization, rather than the end product
that is important. It was only necessary to build enough of the formal model to test the properties in which we were
interested. Maintenance of fidelity between multiple representations of the same requirements (as they evolve) is still a
problem, and deserves further study.
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1 Introduction
Requirements engineering methods typically provide a set of notations for expressing software specifications, together
with tools for checking properties of specifications, such as completeness and consistency. In general, such methods
demand a full commitment. It is assumed that the method will be used to construct a complete specification, which will
then act as a baseline for subsequent development phases. However, to validate and verify large specifications for
safety-critical real-time systems, it is sensible to apply a number of different methods, to overcome weaknesses and
biases of each individual method. For example, a formal method might be used to model a critical portion of an
informal specification, to check safety and liveness properties of that portion. In order to manage the application of
multiple methods, it is necessary to develop and maintain alternative representations of partial specifications, and to
express the relationships between them.
This paper describes a case study of the use of formal specification as a tool for Independent Verification and
Validation (IV&V). Our intention is to use formal methods not as a part of the development process itself, but as a
'shadow' activity, performed by an independent team of experts. Our long-term expectation is that this approach will
turn out to be a less painful way of introducing formal methods into well-established, large-scale software development
processes.
There are a number of questions that need to be addressed before formal methods can be used in this way. Most
published case studies of formal methods have focussed on the use of a formal specification as a baseline from which
design and code can be verified [1]. In contrast, we have been applying formal methods for intermittent "spot checks"
to test for errors as the requirements evolve. The term "lightweight formal methods" has been used to describe this
approach [2]. In this context, the formal specification may be dispensable -- what is important is the insight gained
from the process of formalizing partial views of the requirements and from validating properties of the resulting
models. However, it is still necessary to demonstrate fidelity between the original (informal) specification, and the
formal model. Furthermore, iterative application of this approach can be greatly facilitated if the relationships between
the partial views are captured [3].
The context for this work is the development of software for the International Space Station (ISS) project. Boeing
Space and Defense Group Houston (Prime) is responsible for supervising the overall development and integration of
NASA-IVV-97-010
NASA IV&V Facility, Fairmont, West Virginia
Formal Methods for Verification and Validation of partial
specifications: A Case Study
Steve Easterbrook and John Callahan
July 28, 1997
This technical report is a product of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA) Software Program, an agency wide program to promote continual improvement
of software engineering within NASA. The goals and strategies of this program are
documented in the NASA software strategic plan, July 13, 1995.
Additional information is available from the NASA Software IV&V Facility on the
World Wide Web site http://www.ivv.nasa.govl
This research was funded under cooperative Agreement #NCC 2-979 at the NASA/WVU
Software Research Laboratory.
International Space Station software. There are three Product Groups (PGs), McDonnell Douglas Aerospace, Rockwell
Aerospace - Rocketdyne and Boeing Space and Defense Group Huntsville, who are developing several key Computer
Software Configuration Items (CSCIs). There are also several International Partners (IPs) including Russia, Japan,
Canada, and the European Space Agency, who are developing software that will need to be incorporated into ISS. With
over 45 flight computers and an estimated 1.1 million source line of flight code, the potential problems are
considerable. Software IV&V is being performed by Intermetrics. The Intermetrics team is based at Fairmont, W.Va.,
with personnel stationed in Houston and Huntsville in order to interact with the development teams.
In section 2, we outline the IV&V process, and discuss the aspects of this process that hinder effective IV&V. The
remainder of the paper focuses on the use of methods and tools within this process. The study made use of a
combination of AND/OR tables [4], the Software Cost Reduction (SCR) approach [5], and the SPIN model checker [6].
Application of formal methods in this context was not always easy. The informal specification from which we derived
our models did not permit an easy translation into a state-based model. We encountered problems in demonstrating
fidelity, and providing traceability between the two. Section 4 discusses the issues involved in maintaining multiple
representations of requirements, and the use of consistency checking to increase fidelity.
We conclude that in an IV&V context, the analytical benefits offered by formal methods have to be weighed against the
effort needed to maintain fidelity between a formal model and the informal specification used by the development
team. An IV&V team needs to be able to perform partial analyses on partial specifications, without being tied to any
one formalism. The analysis carried out must be sufficient to reveal important problems, as opposed to surface defects.
Further analysis is a waste of effort until these problems have been fixed. This conclusion implies a change of
perspective for the use of formal methods: while the specification is still evolving it is important to identify quickly any
major defects; it is not necessary to perform a complete analysis. Tools that are geared towards finding and
characterizing such problems (E.g. SCR* [5], Nitpick [7], etc.) are more useful than tools geared towards proving
correctness (E.g. theorem provers).
2 Context: The IV&V Process
For Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V), the software customer hires a separate contractor to analyze the
products and process of the software development contractor. This analysis is performed in parallel with the
development process, throughout the software lifecycle, and in no way replaces in-house verification and validation.
IV&V is applied in high-cost and safety-critical projects to overcome analysis bias and reduce development risk. The
customer relies on the IV&V contractor as an informed, unbiased advocate to assess the status of a project's schedule,
cost, and the viability of its product during development. Most importantly, the IV&V contractor should be engaged as
early as possible in the project: studies have shown that IV&V has the biggest impact in the early phases, especially in
the requirements phase [8].
As an example IV&V activity, consider the analysis of specifications on the Space Station project. The relevant
development contractor writes a Software Requirements Specification (SRS) for each Software Configuration Item
(CSCI). These specifications are written in natural language, and follow the format of DOD-STD-2167A. The IV&V
contractor periodically receives copies of the SRS documents, in various stages of completion. The IV&V contractor
analyzes these for technical integrity, in order to identify any requirements problems and risks. The kind of analysis
performed will vary according to the level and the type of specification, and will cover issues such as clarity, testability,
traceability, consistency and completeness. If problems are identified, the IV&V contractor may recommend that either
the requirements be rewritten, or the problem be tracked through subsequent phases.
Performing IV&V on large projects is far from straightforward. Problems faced by the IV&V contractor include:
Resource allocation - A complete, detailed analysis of the entire system is infeasible. Effort has to be allocated so as to
maximize effectiveness. A criticality and risk analysis may be performed to determine which components need the
most scrutiny. Timing is also a factor; effort needs to be allocated at the right points in the development of a
product (e.g. a document), so that the product is mature enough to be analyzed, but not so mature that it cannot be
changed.
Short timeseales - To be most effective, IV&V reports are needed as quickly as possible. There is always a delay
between the delivery of an interim product to the IV&V team, and the completion of analysis of that product.
During this time, the development process continues. Hence, if IV&V analysis takes too long, the results might be
available too late to be useful. In general, the earlier an error is reported, the cheaper it is to correct.
Lack of access - Contact between the development team and the IV&V team is difficult to manage. The IV&V team
needs to maintain independence, whilst ensuring they obtain enough information from the developers to do their
job.Fromthedevelopers'point of view, interaction with the IV&V team represents a cost overhead, which can
interfere with project deadlines. Inevitably, the IV&V contractor has less access to the development team than is
ideal.
Evolving products - Documentation from the development team is usually made available to the IV&V contractor in
draft form, to facilitate early analysis. The drawback is that documents may be revised while the IV&V team is
analyzing them, making the results of the analysis irrelevant before it is finished.
Reporting the right problems - The IV&V contractor has, by necessity, considerable discretion over the kinds of
analysis to perform on different products. It also has discretion over which problems to report. It is vital to the
effective use of IV&V that the IV&V contractor prioritizes the problems it identifies. If too many trivial problems
are reported, this may swamp the communication channels with the developer and the customer.
Lack of voice - The IV&V contractor may have difficulty in getting its message across, especially when the
development contractor disputes IV&V's assessment. Often, problems found by IV&V have cost and schedule
implications, and in such circumstances the customer may be more willing to listen to assurances from the
developer. The effectiveness of IV&V then depends on having a high-placed advocate within the customer
organization.
Despite these problems, IV&V has been shown to be a cost-effective means of improving the quality of the software
product, and providing extra assurance for high-cost, safety-critical projects [9, 10]. In addition to providing analysis of
project artifacts (e.g. requirements, code, test plans), the presence of IV&V in the lifecycle also has a positive effect on
the quality of the software. Our work suggests that the interaction between the IV&V and development teams drives
improvements in both products and processes [11, 12]. This effect, however, is difficult to capture and quantify.
In this paper we report our work in the evaluation and adaptation of tools and methods for IV&V, and in particular the
potential of formal methods to address the problems we have described. The choice of the right methods and tools is
important to the success of IV&V. Ideally, an IV&V contractor will have access to all the tools used by the
development team, including the ability to share all project databases. However, the IV&V team also needs to
supplement these with additional methods and tools, to address any gaps or weaknesses in the coverage of the
developer's tools. These additional tools need to complement the developer's tools, so that interoperability does not
become a problem. The use of these additional tools is an important factor in ensuring that IV&V is truly independent.
It is often the case that the use of a particular method or tool by the IV&V team leads to the adoption of that method or
tool by the developers. In part this is due to the 'watchdog effect': if the developers know that their product will be
analyzed in a particular way, it is in their interest to perform the analysis themselves before releasing it. If this seems to
be a rather negative reason to adopt a technique, there is also a positive aspect. Because the IV&V team is out of the
critical path for the software development effort, they have more scope for experimentation with new techniques than
the developers [13]. Hence, in some ways the IV&V team can play a role as a proving ground for new techniques, and
can come to be an agent of process improvement. For these reasons, we believe that IV&V offers a practical route
through which formal methods may be introduced into projects that would otherwise not be able to adopt them.
There are still problems to be overcome whenever the IV&V team adopts a tool that is not used by the developers. If
the IV&V team uses a formal specification tool, the informal specification delivered by the developers will need to be
translated into the formal specification language not just once, but each time the developers produce a new draft. Any
problems identified by using the tool must be traced back to the informal specification, before they can be reported.
There must be a reasonable assurance that the formal specification remains faithful to the original, otherwise any
analysis performed on it is worthless. Hence, keeping track of the relationship between the formal and informal
specifications is vital.
Lightweight formal methods seems to offer an ideal tools for IV&V. We use the term 'lightweight' to indicate that the
methods can be used to perform partial analysis on partial specifications, without a commitment to developing and
baselining complete, consistent formal specifications. The formal methods are used to model critical chunks of an
informal specification, to check that key properties hold. Application of the methods is driven by the needs of the
project, and is used as a modeling tool to answer questions that arise during verification and validation. In the
remainder of the paper we describe a case study that investigated the applicability of lightweight formal methods to an
IV&V effort.
(2.16.3.f) While acting as the bus controller, the C&C MDM CSCI shall set the e,c,w,
indicator identified in Table 3.2.16-II for the corresponding RT to "failed" and set the
failure status to "failed" for all RT's on the bus upon detection of transaction errors of
selected messages to RTs whose 1553 FDIR is not inhibited in two consecutive processing
frames within 100 millisec of detection of the second transaction error if; a backup BC is
available, the BC has been switched in the last 20 sec, the SPD card reset capability is
inhibited, or the SPD card has been reset in the last 10 major (10-second) frames, and
either:
i. the transaction errors are from multiple RT's, the current channel has been reset within
the last major frame, or
2. the transaction errors are from multiple RT's, the bus channel's reset capability is
inhibited, and the current channel has not been reset within the last major frame.
Figure 1: An example of a level 3 requirement for Bus FDIR. This requirement specifies the circumstances
under which all remote terminals (RTs) on the bus should be switched to their backups.
3 The Case Study
The purpose of this case study was to analyze the detailed Fault Detection, Isolation and Recovery (FDIR)
requirements associated with the bus controller for the main 1553 communications bus on the space station. The study
was conducted at the request of the Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) team. The IV&V team was having
particular difficulty validating the bus FDIR requirements, as they were hard to read, and some of the properties they
wished to test could not be established using existing informal methods. The study was conducted by the authors, as
part of a larger study of the use of formal methods in the V&V process [14].
The requirements for Bus FDIR had been expressed in natural language, with a supporting flowchart showing the
processing steps involved. The flowchart did not have the status of a requirement, but was merely provided for
guidance; the intention was that the prose completely expressed the requirements. The prose contained a number of
long complicated sentences, expressing complex conjunctions and disjunctions of conditions (E.g. see figure 1). The
IV&V team had recommended that to improve clarity, the requirements should be re-written in a tabular form
(specifically, as truth tables similar to those used by Heimdahl & Leveson [4]). This recommendation had been rejected
because of the cost involved in re-writing them all. The IV&V team was the faced with the problem of how to validate
the informal statement of the requirements, given that this informal statement would act as the baseline. Hence, the
IV&V team generated their own tabular versions, in order to facilitate the kinds of analysis they wished to perform.
3. 1 Approach
Our approach to the application of formal methods in an IV&V context follows a simple four step process as follows:
1) restate the requirements in a clear, precise and unambiguous format;
2) identify & correct internal inconsistencies;
3) test the requirements by proving statements about expected behavior;
4) feed the results back to the requirements authors.
In some cases step 1 involves the use of an intermediate representation, as abstractions introduced in the formalization
do not necessarily have any natural correspondences in the original requirements statements. In such cases,
intermediate representations help to ease the translation process, and help to provide a traceability path between the
informal and formal statements.
For this case study, the four step approach was applied as follows. Each individual requirement was restated as a truth
table, to clarify the logic. These were then combined into a single state-machine model, using SCR [5]. The SCR model
was checked for consistency using the SCR toolset. Properties of the model were then tested in two ways. Firstly, static
properties of the state model, such as disjointness and coverage, were tested using the built-in checker in the SCR tool.
Secondly, dynamic properties of the model were tested by translating the SCR state machine model into PROMELA
[6], and applying the SPIN model checker to explore its behavior. This allowed us to explore timing properties that
OR
C&CMDMactingasthebuscontroller T....T_- T .__TT
Detectionoftransactionerrorsintwoconsecutiveprocessing T T T
Frames
:rrorsareonselectedmessages T_.T_!
:he RT's 1553 FDIR is not inhibited T T T
_. backup BC is available T .__T_T _..T__T
A I'he BC has been switched in the last 20 seconds T T T
N I'he SPD card reset capability is inhibited T _ _:__.
D I'he SPD card has been reset in the last 10 major (10 second) . . T
Frames __ __ --
Fbe transaction errors are from multiple RTs T T i T
I'he current channel has been reset within the last major frame -_ T
I'he bus channel's reset capability is inhibited -- T
--
Table 1: The truth table version of the requirement shown in figure 1, showing the four
conditions (the four columns) under which the action should be carried out. A dot indicates
"don't care".
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
---if-
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could not be validated in SCR. The results were fed back to the development team through the normal IV&V reporting
process.
The choices of method and notation to use in the study were entirely pragmatic. In each case, the choice was made only
after the previous step was underway, and the decision was driven by a need to test certain properties. The initial truth
table representation was chosen as it was precise, easy to read, and represented approximately the same abstraction as
the original informal requirements (See table I). These tables are modeled on the AND/OR tables adopted by Leveson
during the development of the RSML specifications for TCAS II [4].
SCR was chosen as it offered a tabular notation that corresponded well to the truth tables that the IV&V team had
already adopted, and it provided tool support for checking consistency of state models. The consistency checking in
SCR is sufficiently sophisticated that it allowed us to express some of the validation properties as consistency checks.
Specifically, we wanted to establish that each failure mode in the model was disjoint (i.e. that there was no condition in
which two different failure modes would be diagnosed simultaneously), and that together the failure modes covered all
possible combinations of failure conditions. By expressing the failure modes as a mode transition table in SCR, we
could test these properties automatically. Most importantly, the tool did not require us to define the complete state
model in order to test these properties. A further advantage of SCR was that the consistency checker in the SCR tool
provides a counter-example whenever an inconsistency is found. The provision of counter-examples is important in
tracing problems back to the informal specification, and in convincing the development team that there really is a
problem.
The SPIN model checker was adopted for the final part of the study _, as it allowed us to explore dynamic aspects of the
state model, including the ability to simulate different types of error condition. Properties of interest were expressed as
"never clauses", so that the model checker would report any reachable state where the property was satisfied.
Interesting error conditions, such as intermittent and repeating faults, were simulated by including a test harness in the
PROMELA model, to set and reset the inputs to the fault detection model. Strictly speaking this test harness was
unnecessary, as it merely produced a specialization of the original model. However, we found it useful as a way of
reducing the search space, and observing certain key behaviors directly, rather than searching for them in the model.
3.2 Procedure
The generation of a tabular interpretation of each individual requirement proved to be hard, as there are a number of
ambiguities in the prose requirements. These ambiguities concern the associativity of 'and' and 'or' in English, and the
correct binding of subclauses of long sentences. For example, in figure 1, it is not clear what the phrase "in two
consecutive processing frames" refers to. To confirm the existence of such ambiguities, the requirement shown in
l Note: since this case study was conducted, the spin model checker has been incorporated into the SCR toolset [15].
Current
Mode
Normal
Conditions
errors bus bus bus backup BC card card errors channel channel
in two swch'd switch swch'd BC swch'd reset reset from reset reset
cons. last inhibit this avail, in last inhibit last 10 mult. last inhibit
frames frame frame 20 sec frames RTs frame
@T F -
@T T F F
@T T F F
@T F F T T
@T F F T F T
@T T F T
@T F T F T
@T T F F T
@T F T F F T
@T T F T T T
@T T F T T F T
@T T F T T T
@T T F T T F T
@T T T T T T
@T T T T T F T
@T T T T T T
@T T T T T F T
Next
Mode
switch
buses
reset the
channel
reset the
card
switch RT
to backup
switch BC
to backup
switch
all RTs
Table 2: An SCR Mode transition table. Each of the central columns represents a condition, showing whether it
should be true or false; '-' means "don't care"; '@T' indicates a trigger condition for the mode transition. The
four columns of table I correspond to the last four rows of this table. The semantics of SCR require this table to
represent a function, so that the disjunction of all the rows covers all possible conditions (coverage), and the
conjunction of any two rows is false (disjointness).
Figure 1 was given to four different people, for translation into tabular form. Four semantically different tables resulted.
By comparing these different interpretations, an extensive list of ambiguities was compiled. The ambiguities were
resolved through detailed reading of the documentation, and questioning the original authors. This process also
revealed some inconsistencies in the way in which terminology was used.
Merging the individual AND/OR tables to produce the SCR model (Table 2) was not straightforward. Although there
were a number of conditions common to several of the tables, the wording varied, and it was not always obvious
whether similar sounding phrases actually referred to the same condition, due to inconsistencies in the use of
terminology. For example the condition "the bus has been switched in the major (10-second) frame" appeared in one
paragraph, and "the bus has been switched in the last major frame" appeared in another. We initially assumed these to
be equivalent. However, this led to an inconsistency in the table. In fact the former refers to the current frame, while
the latter refers to the previous frame. There were numerous places where we had to make assumptions to proceed, and
we carefully recorded these as annotations to the original text, to be checked with the developers.
Having obtained a clearer statement of the requirements, the next step was to explore some of the properties that ought
to be true of these requirements. Example properties are "for each combination of failure conditions, there is an FDIR
response specified" and "for each combination of failure conditions there is at most one FDIR response specified".
These properties correspond to checks for coverage and completeness of a mode table in SCR. By constructing a state-
based model in which each of the requirements represented a transition from the "normal" mode to a unique failure
mode, the coverage and disjointness tests in the SCR tool would test these properties Note that the failure modes are
not identified explicitly in the original specification. In Table 2, we have named them after the corrective action rather
than the type of failure, to preserve traceability to the informal specification. A number of disjointness problems were
identified at this stage, which are described below.
The final part of this study was to explore the dynamic properties of the model. For example, some of the requirements
express conditions that test whether various recovery actions have already been tried. In order to validate these
conditions, it was necessary to explore the dynamic behavior of the specified system in the face of multiple failures,
and recurring failures. To do this we needed a way to exhaustively search the state space for safety and liveness
properties. We needed to add non-determinism to the model, to simulate possible occurrences of faults, as inputs to the
system being modeled. The state-based model expressed in SCR was translated into PROMELA, and the model
checker SPIN was used to explore the behaviors.
proctype FDIR_mode_pc
{
mtype mode = normal;
end:
do :: new_frame?true ->
if
:: (errors == false II FDIR_inhibit_RT == true) -> mode = normal
:: else -> if
:: /* [branches here for each failure mode] */
:: (((backup_BC_avail == true) && (BC_switched_20 sec == false)
&& ( (cd_reset_inhibit == true) I I (cd_reset == true) )
&& (((errors_mult_RTs == true) && (ch_reset_last == true))
II ((errors_mult_RTs == true) && [oh_reset_inhibit == true)
&& (ch_reset_last == false)))) && mode == errorl) ->
atomic{ mode = fm_BC_failure;
BC_switch_count = BC_SWITCH_TIMEOUT };
BC_switcher!true
od
:: else -> assert(false)
fi
fi; new_frame!false
/* This is a coverage error */
Figure2: Excerptfrom the promela model.Theinnerif loopcontainsbranchesforeachof thefailuremodesshownintable2.
Onlythe codefor thefailuremode"Switch BCto backup"is shownhere.This branchcorrespondsto four rowsinTable2.
The PROMELA model consisted of a number of concurrent processes. The main process modeled the failure diagnosis
model, and was translated more or less directly from the SCR mode table. Figure 2 shows a portion of this process, and
can be compared with the mode table shown in table 2. Additional processes were added for: the state space of inputs to
the system, a timer to model timeout behavior, and a simulation of the state of each of the devices that the FDIR system
interacts with.
Experimentation with this model in SPIN indicated some inconsistencies in the timing constraints that had not been
revealed in the SCR model. Once these were fixed, the model checker was used to verify properties such as "if an error
persists after all recovery actions have been tried, the bus FDIR will eventually report failure of itself to a higher level
FDIR domain". Figure 3 shows how a claim such as this is translated into a Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) formula, to
be used by the model checker.
3.3 Findings
In addition to a number of minor problems with inconsistent use of terminology, the following major problems were
reported:
1) There were significant ambiguities in the prose requirements, as a result of the complex sentence structure.
Some of these ambiguities could be resolved by studying the higher level FDIR requirements, and the
specifications for the bus architecture. The ambiguities that arose from the combination of 'ands' and 'ors' in the
same sentence could not be resolved in this way, and could lead to mistakes in the design. These ambiguities
were detected in the initial reformulation of the requirements as truth tables.
2) There was one missing requirement to test the value of the Bus Switch Inhibit Flag before attempting to switch
to the backup bus. This was detected during the test for disjointness in the SCR specification.
#define p (errors==true)
#define q (mode==fm__BC_failure)
[](p -> <>(!p \/ q))
Figure3:A sampleproofclaimfor the SPINmodel. The symbolsI] and <>arethe usualtemporaloperators'always'and
'eventually'.The claimis "whenever an erroroccurs,eventuallya statewillbe reachedInwhichtheerror is clearedor thebus
controllerwill report failureof itselfto a higherlevel FDIRdomain".This claimfailed,leadingto finding4 describedin section
3.3
3) The prose requirements were missing a number of preconditions that enforce the ordering in which the inference
rules should be applied. The accompanying flowchart for these requirements implied a sequence for these rules.
An attempt had been made in the prose requirements to express this sequence as a set of preconditions for each
rule, to ensure that all the earlier rules have been tested and have failed. The preconditions did not completely
capture the precedences implied by flowchart. This corresponded with an informal observation made by the
IV&V team that the ordering of the requirements should be made explicit. This problem was found during the
test for disjointness in the SCR specification.
4) The timing constraints expressed in the requirements were incorrect. Several of the failure isolation tests
referred to testing whether certain FDIR actions had already been tried "in the previous processing frame".
However, as each FDIR recovery action is followed by a time-out in order for the action to take effect, and as
further FDIR intervention is only initiated on occurrence of errors in two consecutive processing frames, these
tests can never be true. This was discovered during model checking of the PROMELA model.
3.4 Observations
The study analyzed 15 pages of level 3 requirements, and was conducted over a period of four months, by one person
working part time. The total effort was approximately 1.5 person months. The main effort was in formalizing the
requirements. Translation from the SCR model to PROMELA was relatively straightforward, and took two days effort.
Once a formal model was obtained, testing of the properties was straightforward, as both the SCR tool and the SPIN
model checker provided facilities for automated checking of these properties, and provided counter-examples when the
tests failed. Although problems were found both during formalization and the property checking, the latter problems
were more serious. It is unlikely that they would have been discovered in this phase without the use of formal methods.
A major difficulty during this study was the volatility of the requirements. New drafts of the requirements document
were being released approximately every two months. This meant that in at least one case (finding 3 above), the
problem had already been fixed by the time it was discovered in this study. This particular finding had already been
observed informally and reported by the IV&V team, and had been addressed by reducing the complexity of this
section of the requirements. We mitigated the problem of fluctuating requirements by only doing the minimum amount
of modeling necessary to test the properties that were of interest. For example, the SCR model is not a complete state
model, as it models only a subset of the state transitions expressed in the requirements. The transitions for returning to
the normal state have not been modeled. This partial model was sufficient to perform the coverage and disjointness
analysis.
It should also be noted that in order to perform the analysis in this study, the SCR notation was slightly misused. The
modes shown in figure 4 do not represent true modes in the SCR sense - a more correct representation would express
these as output events from the FDIR system. However, defining them as modes permitted the use of coverage and
disjointness tests on the transitions. This reflects our pragmatic approach in which the formal method is applied in
whatever way gives the most benefit, without necessarily following the original intent of the method.
4 Discussion
This paper presented a case study on the use of formal methods for IV&V. The results are very encouraging: the
translation process was extremely valuable in identifying ambiguities and improving our understanding of the
specification. In this process, a number of errors were found. Analysis of a partial formal specification demonstrated
several important errors in the specification, and appears to be a powerful means of gaining maximal results from
minimal effort. We constructed just enough of a model to test the properties we were interested in, without any further
commitment to the method.
The study described in this paper differs from other studies in the literature in several ways. The majority of published
case studies of the use of formal methods are post hoc application of formal method to on-going or finished projects.
Such studies are demonstrate what formal methods can do, and help to refine the methods, but they do not help to
answer questions of how such methods can be integrated with existing practices on large projects. A few notable
exceptions have used formal methods 'live' during the development of real systems [1, 4, 16, 17]. However, in all these
cases, the emphasis was on the use of formal notations as a part of the baseline specifications, from which varying
degrees of formal verification of the resulting design and implementation are possible. In contrast, we applied formal
methods as a means of performing V&V on an informal baseline specification. Rather than treating formal
specificationasanendproductoftherequirementsphase,weusedit toanswerquestionsandimprovethequalityofthe
existingspecifications.
TheintroductionofformalmethodsasanIV&Vtechniqueforlargeprojectsoffersalowriskapproachtotechnology
transfer.Thisapproachallowsustobeflexibleandpragmatic.Theamountofformalmodelingperformedcanbe
variedaccordingtotheprojectneeds.Inparticular,thecasestudyindicatesthatsignificantresultscanbeobtainedfrom
theuseof formalmethodsusingpartial validation of partial specifications. For an IV&V team, the formal methods
provide an additional tool to be used on highly critical sections of a specification, or to test certain key properties,
where existing techniques cannot help.
There are two potential pitfalls with this approach: it is hard to guarantee fidelity between informal and formal
specifications, and it is hard to manage consistency between partial specifications expressed in different notations.
These problems arise from the need to maintain both informal and formal specifications of the same requirements.
The fidelity issue is more of a problem in IV&V than in development. A formal model developed by the IV&V team
cannot replace the informal specification. The IV&V team must therefore either persuade the developers to adopt
formal notations themselves, or take care to maintain fidelity between the developers' informal specifications and their
own formal models. The formal models are only useful for checking the developer's specifications if they are accurate
representations of the developer's specifications. Also, when analysis of the formal models reveals problems in the
specifications, these problems must be traced back to the informal specification before they can be reported.
Although the fidelity problem can affect the utility of any formal analysis performed by the IV&V team, we should
point out that it does not affect all the benefits of formal specification. The process of translating pieces of the informal
specification into a formal notation has benefit not just for the analysis that it leads to, but also for the removal of
ambiguities and for improved understanding. For this benefit, it is the process of formalization, rather than the end
product that is important. In particular, we observed that the IV&V analysts had a much better understanding of the
requirements after conducting the translation exercise than they would normally obtain.
The fidelity problem is really a special case of a more general problem: management of consistency between partial
specifications expressed in different notations [3]. For instance, the AND/OR tables have a clear relationship with the
SCR mode tables, but if we make a correction to one of the AND/OR tables, it is fairly tedious to identify the
corresponding correction in the SCR tables. Similarly, each time the developers issue a new informal specification, we
need to update our tabular representations. Although it may seem that the use of both AND/OR tables and SCR models
together would compound this problem, the opposite is true. The AND/OR tables mapped clearly onto the textual
requirements, while the relationship between the AND/OR tables and the SCR model was relatively straightforward.
Therefore, the use of AND/OR tables as an intermediate representation reduced the traceability gap, and made it easier
to keep the formal model up to date. There remains, however, a significant bookkeeping problem.
There is a growing body of work on managing consistency in specifications. Our previous work demonstrated how to
delay the resolution of inconsistency, and provided a generic framework for expressing consistency relationships [3].
Other work has taken consistency checking further, making use of semantic models underlying a method to determine
what consistency rules are needed and how to operationalize them. For example, Heitmeyer's work with consistency
checking in SCR [5] uses the semantics of SCR to define a series of consistency rules ranging from simple syntactic
checks (e.g. that all names are unique) to sophisticated properties of tables (e.g. coverage and disjointness). Similarly,
Leveson's work on consistency checking in RSML [4] uses the semantics of the statechart formalism to determine a set
of consistency rules that can be tested, tractably, using a high level abstract model. In both these approaches, the
completeness of the formal specifications is important, and consistency checking is seen as part of the process of
obtaining a complete, consistent specification.
Unfortunately, these approaches do not help with consistency checking between partial specifications expressed in
different notations. Because the IV&V process is concurrent with and complementary to the development process,
there is an unusually large amount of flexibility in how a formal method can be used. There is no need to make a
commitment to any one formal notation, just as there is no need to develop complete specifications. In fact, the aim of
the IV&V agent is not to perform complete analyses, but to do just enough analysis to check specific aspects of the
software. Development of complete formal models is therefore unnecessary and may be counter-productive. For
example, in our second experiment, the limited analysis we performed on a partial model was sufficient to reveal a
major problem; the existence of this problem meant that any further effort to complete the model would have been
wasted.
Whiletheuseofpartialspecificationsoffersgreaterflexibilityin theuseofmethodsandtools,it alsomeansthatwedo
nothaveawell-definedmethodfromwhichtogenerateasetofconsistencyrelationships.Thereareimplicit
consistencyrelationshipsbetweentheassortedpartialspecificationsdrawnfromdifferentmethods,butthereisno
overall'method'totelluswhatheserelationshipsare.Actually,thereisamethod:theproblemisthatthemethodis
implicit,andtosomextentisgeneratedonthefly.Forexample,thereisamethodforgeneratingSCRmodetables
fromtheAND/ORtables,butthemethodwasnotdefinedbeforewedidit.Withsomeffort,wecouldformalizethis
method,anddefinesemanticrelationshipsbetweenthetwotypesoftable.However,thiseffortwillonlybeworthwhile
if weintendtore-usethemethodextensively.Inthemeantime,wewouldliketohavetoolstohelpuskeeptrackof
consistencyrelationshipsinouropportunisticuseofpartialspecifications.
Inourpreviousworkdefiningconsistencyrelationshipsbetweenviewpoints,weassumedthatthemajorityofsuch
rulesaredefinedbythemethod[18].Theviewpointsframeworkexplicitlysupportsheprocessof methodefinition,
inwhich,amongotherthings,theinter-viewpointrelationshipsaredefined.Hencethegeneralproblemofdefining
arbitraryrelationshipsbetweenanytwonotationsi avoided.However,wealsorecognizedthatsomeconsistency
relationshipscouldnotbedefinedinthisway,andgavetheexampleofauser-definedsynonymrelationshipbetween
twodifferentlabels.Weoutlinedanapproachtodiscoveringsuchrelationshipsthroughlowlevelprocessmonitoring.
Wenowregardthistypeofconsistencyrelationshipasvitaltoanyapproachinvolvingpartialspecifications.
5 Conclusions
This paper has described our initial work in the use of formal methods in an IV&V project. We have discussed how the
demands placed on methods and tools in IV&V are different from their use in a development context. We have also
discussed how IV&V can act as a process improvement agent, and hence can be a fruitful way of introducing formal
methods into large projects.
As with all potential uses of a new method, any extra effort needed to use the method must be more than offset by the
benefits it brings. Use of a method in IV&V is no different. We can divide the benefits of using formal methods in
IV&V into three areas:
• The process of translating portions of a specification into formal notations helps to detect ambiguities and
increase readability, even if the translation is only partial. The process can also be used to catch
misunderstandings, thus increasing the confidence that the IV&V team is interpreting the specification
correctly. The process of having several analysts produce their own tabular translations was particularly useful
in this respect. Differences in the tables they produced allowed us to pinpoint exactly where the ambiguities
were.
• The partial formal models can be analyzed for internal consistency, to help establish the technical integrity of
the original, informal specification. This step also helps to check that the models are faithful to the original.
• The partial formal models can be tested against key domain properties, to validate the original requirements.
In our study, this included both static and dynamic properties of the state-based model. Such properties are
particularly hard to analyze from the informal specifications. Most importantly, this analysis can be conducted
without the need to build complete models.
From this study, we conclude that lightweight formal methods are an ideal tool for an IV&V agent. They address many
of the problems we identified in section 2:
Limited resources: Lightweight formal methods can be applied to selected portions of specifications. The amount
of modeling and analysis can be adjusted to fit resource constraints.
Short tiraeseales: Partial analysis can generate preliminary results quickly, as the analysis can proceed even
without a full model.
Lack of access: The case study demonstrated that a formal modeling effort can be based almost exclusively on
informal documents. Interaction with the development team was only necessary to check assumptions, and to
discuss the analysis results.
Evolving Products: Small, partial models can be generated quickly, and updated as the specification evolves. The
investment in each model is small enough that they can be discarded if the specification changes significantly.
Avoiding trivial/obvious problems: Formal analysis can reveal subtle problems that escape the notice of
informal, inspection-based methods. In particular, it is a powerful way of detecting timing and safety-related
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problems.Theformalanalysisalsoallowedustoexplorethesignificanceofpotentialerrorsbeforereportingthem.
Lackof voice: Formal methods can help the IV&V agent to strengthen their case when they report issues back to
the customer and developer. Animation of formal models provides a powerful was of demonstrating errors, and
helps to provide a more precise characterization of each problem.
The problems we encountered in applying formal methods were as follows:
• The process of translating into a formal notation is error-prone. Only by duplicating the translation effort were
we able to discover just how much scope there is for misinterpretation. Luckily, our chosen formal notations
were very readable. Therefore it is much easier to compare different tables than it is to compare different
versions of the informal specification.
• For IV&V, fidelity and traceability between the informal and formal specifications is difficult to guarantee.
The value of any analysis carried out by IV&V on the formal model is entirely dependent on how faithful the
formal model is to the developer's informal specification. The IV&V's formal model can not be used in place
of the informal specifications produced by the developers.
• Opportunistic use of partial specifications means that there is not a well-defined method from which to derive
consistency rules. Maintenance of consistency in our partial specifications became a real problem.
The problem of consistency checking in partial specifications written in different notations is important enough to
warrant more attention. We plan to study the problem in more detail by developing a set of tools based on the
ViewPoints framework, which will allow us to model relationships between partial specifications written by different
people. We are also exploring how this problem relates to that of linking test case scenarios to requirements [19].
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